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RECENT DECISIONS

PROcEDURE-FORUM NON CONVENIENS-JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF Doc-

TRINE WHEN STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS RUN ELsEWHERE-Plaintiff, a Mis-

souri resident, brought suit in Arkansas against defendant, a Missouri
corporation authorized to do business in Arkansas, for injuries received in
an accident in Illinois. Plaintiff had filed and dismissed an action in Missouri, and the statute of limitations had run in Illinois. Defendant's motion
for dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens was granted by the trial
court. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded, one justice dissenting.
Although the trial court could in its discretion refuse jurisdiction on the
grounds of forum non conveniens, there was insufficient evidence in this
case upon which a dismissal could be based.' A concurring justice, joining
in the decision to remand on the grounds that the trial court had no power

1 The case was remanded with directions to proceed further on defendant's motion
to dismiss.
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to refuse jurisdiction, argued that a legislative enactment would be required to establish the doctrine in Arkansas. Clifton Running v. Southwest FreightLines, Inc., (Ark. 1957) 303 S.W. (2d) 578.
This case marks the official entry of Arkansas into the group of states
recognizing the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 2 Acceptance of the doctrine in the federal courts in 19473 has seemingly added impetus to its
adoption by the states, six 4 having embraced it since that time. Although
approved by what still remains a decided minority of the states, the fact
that some of those most strongly opposed to the doctrine in the past have
now sanctioned it5 would indicate that it is destined to receive more widespread application. The line of reasoning expressed by the concurring
judge is significant, however, for it reflects a view that is widely held. With
the Supreme Court's removal of the privileges and immunities clause of
Article IV of the United States Constitution as an obstacle to general
acceptance of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 7 perhaps no more
persistent argument against its acceptance has been presented than that of
a court's lack of discretionary power to refuse jurisdiction in the face of a
statute specifically conferring it. That legislative action is required in order
to adopt the doctrine would not seem to be generally true,9 however, for
its origins in Scotland and England were entirely judicial. 10 Moreover,

2 Acceptance of the doctrine by Arkansas has been expected. See Grovey v. Washington
Nat. Ins. Co., 196 Ark. 697, 119 S.W. (2d) 503 (1938). The other states accepting the
doctrine are California, Price v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 42 Cal. (2d)
577, 268 P. (2d) 457 (1954); Delaware, Eastern Union Co. of Delaware v. Moffet Tunnel
Improvement District, 6 W. W. Harr. (36 Del.) 488, 178 A. 864 (1934); Florida, Hagen v.
Viney, 124 Fla. 747, 169 S. 391 (1936); Illinois,"Whitney v. Madden, 400 Ill. 185, 79 N.E.
(2d) 593 (1948); Louisiana, Stewart v. Litchenberg, 148 La. 195, 86 S. 734 (1920); Maine,
Foss v. Richards, 126 Me. 419, 139 A. 313 (1927); Massachusetts, Universal Adjustment
Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152 (1933); Minnesota, Johnson v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co., 243 Minn. 58, 66 N.W. (2d) 763 (1954); New Hampshire,
Jackson & Sons v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 86 N.H. 341, 168 A. 895 (1933);
New Jersey, Kantakevich v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 18 N.J. Misc. 77,
10 A. (2d) 651 (1940); New York, Gregonis v. Philadelphia'& Reading Coal & Iron Co.,
235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223 (1923); Oklahoma, St. Louis-San Fransisco Ry. Co v. Superior
Court, (Okla. 1955) 290 P. (2d) 118; and Utah, Mooney v. Denver & Rio Grande Western
R. Co., 118 Utah 307, 221 P. (2d) 628 (1950).
3 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
4 Arkansas, California, Illinois, Minnesota, Oklahoma and Utah.
5Compare Boright v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. Ry. Co., 180 Minn. 52, 230 N.W. 457 (1930),
with Johnson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., note 2 supra; Leet v. Union
Pacific R. Co., 25 Cal. (2d) 605, 155 P. (2d) 42 (1944), with Price v. Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Ry., note 2 supra.
6 U.S. CoNs'r., art. IV, §2.
7 Douglas v. New Haven R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
8See Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840, 20 S.W. (2d) 684 (1929); Mattone v. Argentina,
123 Ohio St. 393, 175 N.E. 603 (1931); Rouw Co. v. Railway Express Agency, (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941) 154 S.W. (2d) 143.
9 At least one statute seems to preclude judicial adoption of the doctrine, however.
Ala. Code (1940) tit. 7, §97.
10 See generally, 34 VA. L. Rxv. 811 (1948).

1958]

RECENT DECISIONS

441

most of the states which have adopted the doctrine have done so without
statutory authorization." The reasoning of these courts varies with the
relative emphasis they place on one or the other of the two main purposes
of the doctrine; protection of the parties against the hardships of trial in
an inconvenient forum, and protection of the courts from the burden of
imported litigation. Those emphasizing protection of the litigants state
that courts of general jurisdiction have inherent power to do whatever is
12
possible under the general principles of jurisdiction to insure a fair trial.
Those aiming more at resisting imposition on the courts tend to justify
dismissal by resort to the legislative policy underlying the statutes controlling jurisdiction and venue. A statute stating that nonresidents of the
state may be sued where found may be said by the court to have been
enacted solely for the benefit of citizens of the state, and not for nonresidents seeking to import causes of action arising elsewhere.' 3 If the state
has a change of venue statute authorizing change of the place of trial when
the ends of justice would be promoted, the court may find this to lend
authority for dismissing the case in order that a more convenient forum
outside the state may be utilized. 14
Although some of those arguing that adoption of forum non conveniens
must be by the legislature do so because acceptance by judicial pronouncement violates their conception of the relative roles of the legislature and
the judiciary in the area of jurisdiction of the courts,' 5 others go beyond
this, stating that the vagueness and lack of clearly defined criteria for
application of the doctrine require safeguards of a type that can best be
provided by the legislature.'A This latter argument, based upon absence of
adequate safeguards, draws much of its vitality from the difficulty courts
have had in evaluating the role which the running of the statute of limitations in the other state of possible jurisdiction should play in the decision
to dismiss under forum non conveniens. Commentators on the doctrine' 7
and the majority of the courts applying it's feel that since forum non conveniens presupposes more than one court of jurisdiction, the running of
the statute of limitations in the other state should preclude refusal to accept jurisdiction under the doctrine. This view seems clearly correct in the

1
1See Johnson v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R. Co., note 2 supra, at 78:
"Courts sometimes are more conversant with changes in laws of other jurisdictions that
make adherence to our former decisions impracticable than is the legislature, and in such
cases we must not shun the responsibility of making necessary changes in local law....
12 Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, note 2 supra.
13 Stewart v. Litchenberg, note 2 supra.
14 St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Superior Court, note 2 supra.
15 See Mattone v. Argentina, note 8 supra.
16 See dissent by Carter, J., in Price v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
note 2 supra.
17 Barrett, "The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens," 35 C~A~w. L. Rrv. 380 (1947).
18 See Giles v. Western Air Lines, Inc., (D.C. Minn. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 616; Gore v.
United States Steel Corp., 15 N.J. 301, 104 A. (2d) 670 (1954); Yesuvida v. Pennsylvania
R. Co., 200 Misc. 815, 111 N.Y.S. (2d) 417 (1951).
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case where the plaintiff's choice of forum has been seemingly approved by
the trial court's refusal to dismiss and the statute of limitations in the
other state has run during the process of appeal. Where a plaintiff has
allowed the statute of limitations to run elsewhere before instituting suit in
the "inconvenient forum," however, another rule might seem more correctly
to apply. In the principal case, Arkansas, faced with the second situation,
adopted the view that the running of the statute of limitations had no
bearing upon the decision to dismiss. This position seems sound-a compromise between the desire to leave plaintiff with some forum in which to
litigate his dispute, and the undesirability of allowing him, by his own
laches in failing to bring timely suit elsewhere, to utilize an otherwise
inconvenient forum.
Jerome S. Traum

